Explainer: Suwayda Conflicts and Context 2025
Executive summary
- Clashes broke out between Druze factions and Bedouin armed militants in the Suwayda province, with both sides engaging in violence.
- The Syrian Caretaker Government (SCG) engaged in what it stated were attempts to quell the fighting, but in practice their forces only participated in lethal violence against the Druze population.
- After Israel intervened by bombing SCG military positions under the pretext of helping the Druze, an agreement was reached between the SCG and Druze leadership, with the US as the mediator to ensure its implementation.
- The Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) is attempting to send humanitarian aid to Suwayda, but has not yet received permission from the SCG.
- Violence against the Druze raises concerns for Syria’s other minorities including Kurds, Alawites, Christians, etc, many of whom reside in DAANES-administered regions.
Background
Roughly two-thirds of people living in Suwayda, a province in southern Syria, are part of the Druze sect, an Abrahamic, monotheistic, and syncretic religion. The remaining population of the governorate are almost entirely members of the Christian and Bedouin minorities. The Druze people do not consider themselves Muslim, although their faith stems from Ismailism, a branch of Shia Islam. Despite these origins, the Druze do not follow the Quran, but have their own sacred text called the Epistles of Wisdom (Rasa’il al-Hikma). They are a minority in Syria, making up about 3% of the population overall.
Historically, the Druze participated in Syria’s resistance against French colonization, but did not retain any leadership roles in government due to the Baath party’s purging them from power. Under Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the Druze were mostly appeased by the government, reflecting the Assad administration’s general policy of co-opting minorities or satisfying them to keep the peace. However, with the outbreak of 2011 uprisings against Assad, there were demonstrations against the government in Suwayda. In the course of the Syrian Civil War, the Druze largely avoided taking sides, emphasizing self-defense and local autonomy. Many Druze avoided conscription while the government turned a blind eye to appease them. They kept the Assad government at an arm’s length while maintaining what has been called a form of “quasi-autonomy.”
Within the Druze community of Suwayda, there are three top senior spiritual leaders, The most prominent in the public eye has been Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri, a figure who collaborated with the Assad government at times before coming to oppose the administration toward the end of Assad’s rule. Al-Hajri is likewise known for his cautious and untrusting stance towards the post-Assad Syrian Caretaker Government (SCG). Another Druze leader is Sheikh Yousef Jarbou who has adopted a more conciliatory approach to the SCG. However, Jarbou collaborated with the Assad government during his governance. Lastly, Sheikh Hammoud al-Hinnawi also follows a similar political line as Jarbou, and has indicated his willingness to work with the SCG. Hinnawi’s relationship to the Assad government remains unclear, but he has affirmed his overall loyalty to the Syrian state.
Meanwhile, surrounding regions are primarily populated by tribes of the Arab nomadic peoples known as Bedouin. In contrast to the traditionally agricultural Druze way of life, Bedouins are predominantly herders. In Syria, they mainly live in the desert regions, such as Suwayda, Homs, and Deir ez-Zor. The relationship between the Druze and Bedouin tribes in Suwayda has historically been marked by alternating conflict and cooperation. The problems that arose had more to do with land disputes rather than sectarianism, but were worsened by external parties including the Assad government who would arm select tribal leaders to quell dissent. These tribes also have their own armed militant groups, who throughout the civil war were predominantly against the Assad government and have clashed with Druze factions in recent years. Now, some of these Bedouin armed militant groups are loosely affiliated with the SCG’s Ministry of Defense, or are pro-SCG.
Post-Assad
Since the December 2024 fall of the Assad government, the governorate of Suwayda has sought to maintain this “quasi-autonomy.” However, the abrupt end of Assad’s decades-old, authoritarian rule over Syria simultaneously cast new light on deep societal divisions throughout Syria, a reality which has been reflected in the experience of the Druze minority.
The operation to overthrow Assad was launched by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed al-Sharaaa, a Sunni Islamist militant group which branched from al-Qaeda. After HTS took power, it announced al-Sharaa president and set up a new, HTS-dominated government referred to as the “Syrian Caretaker Government” (SCG).
When the Assad government was ousted, it was not HTS that expelled Assad’s forces out of Suwayda, but rather armed Druze factions. Most of the current Druze military factions have existed in Suwayda since 2014, operating in opposition to the Assad government. They became more prominent in December 2024 during the military operations which led to Assad’s fall, cooperating with many different factions in the “Southern Operations Room,” which was made up of both Sunni and Druze military factions from Suwayda and nearby Daraa and Quinetra. This coalition coordinated to oust Assad forces and has since dissolved. The creation of the Suwayda Military Council (SMC) was officially announced in February 2025. This body is made up of Druze factions and has the stated mission of ensuring stability and security within the governorate. The most prominent faction within the SMC is the ‘Men of Dignity’ (Rijal al Karama), which has links to al-Hajri. After the SMC’s creation, some observers speculated that it might have ties to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish-led, US-allied multi-ethnic armed forces who still control a third of the country’s north-east. This was particularly the case since the SMC’s flag uses similar imagery to the SDF’s own insignia, including an identical map of Syria, while both forces espouse similar political principles. However, there has been no comment from either side regarding any form of relationship. Meanwhile, the SCG assigned Suwayda a governor, Mustafa al-Bakour, who has met with a mix of support and dissatisfaction within the region. Druze leader al-Hajri and al-Bakour have a cooperative relationship and have coordinated on administrative issues. Overall, al-Bakour was a respected figure among the Druze community, helping to mediate on points of tension.
For example, in April 2025, a delegation from a political party from Suwayda was on their way to visit regions governed by the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) when members of the party were arrested by SCG forces. The arrestees faced torture during their imprisonment. Raja Jamil al-Damaqsi, Secretary-General of the Syrian Democratic Affiliation Party, told Rojava Information Center: “There was no basic or legal arrest warrant against us, [regardless of if] we were a political party or a civil society [organization]. They arrested us arbitrarily, on a sectarian basis, and under conditions that no Syrian should have to deal with.” Governor al-Bakour met with this group when they returned to hear their concerns, in a gesture which was positively received.
Following months of similar tensions, a slew of sectarian violence broke out 28 April when a fabricated voice note attributed to a Druze cleric insulting the Prophet Muhammed was widely shared. Dozens of Druze were killed in Ashrafiet-Sahnaya and Jarmana, two Druze-majority suburbs of Damascus, as well as along the Damascus-Suwayda highway. The killings were carried out by SCG General Security Forces and pro-SCG factions. SCG General Security Forces entered the neighborhoods by order of the SCG under the guise of helping to stop the clashes. However, dozens of Druze ended up being arrested instead. Among those killed was the mayor of Ashrafiet-Sahnaya, Hussam Warour. He was executed after welcoming SCG General Security Forces into the suburb. Meanwhile, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) carried out airstrikes near the presidential palace under the pretext of protecting the Druze.
At that time, clashes stopped after a preliminary agreement was reached between Druze leaders and Governor al-Bakour. A more sustainable agreement was underway. Since then, al-Bakour temporarily resigned from his position, after being held hostage by another armed group in exchange for a prisoner in Damascus. After the situation was resolved, al-Bakour was reinstated as governor. However, the incident offers an indication of severe continued instability in the region.
July 2025 violence
Amid these continued tensions, the 13 July abduction of a Druze merchant was the spark that lit the power-keg. The incident erupted into a week of bloody violence that left around 1,500 dead according to the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (SOHR) and around 145,000 people displaced, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
The Damascus-Suwayda road is the only way in and out of the governorate. The SCG has set up checkpoints on these roads, separating Druze faction-controlled Suwayda from surrounding regions controlled by Bedouin militants and SCG-affiliated forces. According to locals, these checkpoints have been the site of repeated violations and security incidents.
An RIC correspondent in the region reports: “There is no doubt that this road has witnessed many incidents of robbery and insults directed at civilians at the al-Masmiya checkpoint. These incidents have led to major tensions. The last incident that led to the outbreak of these clashes was connected to the kidnapping of Fadl Dawara, a vegetable merchant.”
Timeline of Events
11 July
Fadal Dawara is abducted on the Damascus-Suwayda road by armed Bedouin groups. A series of abductions breaks out between Druze factions and armed Bedouins, accompanied by violent clashes.
13 July
The Damascus-Suwayda highway is controlled by Bedouin armed groups, leaving the city cut off.
The SCG Ministry of Interior dispatches General Security Forces to contain the fighting.
14 July
Prisoners are exchanged between Druze factions and Bedouin militants. However, fighting persists.
Druze leader al-Hajri initially welcomes the SCG forces into Suwayda to quell the fighting. He also encourages cooperation between Druze armed factions and the SCG forces.
The DAANES releases a statement condemning “the violations being perpetrated against the people of Suwayda”, while stating that “what is happening in Suwayda does not only target a specific region, but also the unity of Syrians and their will to build a free and democratic state based on pluralism and diversity.”
The DAANES-affiliated Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) releases a statement critiquing the SCG, and condemning Syrian authorities for fueling the conflict which they “consider a dangerous behavior that contradicts the supposed role of any responsible government, which is to protect citizens and ensure their security and safety […] Any government intervention that fuels violence or deepens the societal rift is a flagrant breach of the state’s responsibility to its own people, and exposes the country to further chaos.”
The DAANES-affiliated SDF likewise releases a statement condemning the fighting in Suwayda and calling for a cessation of the attacks.
15 July
Al-Hajri puts out a statement calling for international support. He claims that he was placed under external pressure to accept the SCG forces into the region, in a reference to the former head of the ‘Men of Dignity’, Laith Balous. (Balous has since fled Suwayda and is no longer affiliated with Men of Dignity.)
The SCG declares a ceasefire agreement was reached on paper with the SCG Ministry of Defense and Druze leadership. SCG forces proceed to enter Suwayda with the intention of stopping the fighting.
The SCG forces allegedly join the Bedouin tribes and other pro-SCG factions in indiscriminately attacking Druze factions. Tribes coming from other Syrian regions including Deir ez-Zor, Hama, and Daraa also join with Bedouin tribes, committing violations against Druze locals.
Syrian Caretaker Government Forces attacking in Suwayda.
Suwayda residents start to flee en masse. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) directly strikes a SCG armed convoy, killing at least one person and injuring many others.
16 July
The IDF strikes General Staff Command Building (which houses the Syrian Armed Forces and the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense) in Damascus killing three.
An airstrike in Damascus from the IDF. [RIC]
Airstrike on the General Staff Command Building. [Syria TV]
Suwayda experiences a mass power outage and shortage of medical supplies.
Speaking at the time, an RIC correspondent reported: “Most hospitals are out of service due to a severe shortage of medicine, while bakeries have stopped operating, leading to a shortage of bread. This coincides with a complete power outage in the city. In addition, the internet is severely weak. The displacement continues for fear of massacres and kidnappings.”
A massacre occurs at the Suwayda National Hospital, perpetrated by gunmen alleged to be SCG and pro-SCG Bedouin militant forces.
Screenshot of a video showing the dead bodies from the massacre in Suwayda National Hospital.
SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi says in a post on the platform X that the SDF affirms that the Suwayda issue is a national one and that the solution must be constitutional through dialogue.
An agreement is reached with the SCG and Druze leaders, with the US monitoring its implementation. Some points from the agreement include:
- The removal of all Bedouin tribes and militants, and SCG forces
- The formation of local councils by Suwayda residents to implement aid and services
- The formation of a committee to document violations which will be submitted to the US
- Full integration of Suwayda into the Syrian state, affirming the state’s sovereignty over all areas of the province and restoring all government institutions
- Government control over the Damascus–Suwayda highway
17 July
SCG forces are withdrawing, but fighting still persists between Druze factions and Bedouin armed militants.
President al-Sharaa issues a statement condemning Israeli attacks and says protecting the Druze minority is a priority. He also says he is eager to hold those accountable “those who transgressed and abused our Druze people because they are under the protection and responsibility of the state.” He also announces the withdrawal of SCG forces from Suwayda, indicating his desire to avoid a large-scale confrontation with Israel.
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu says Israel intends to continue imposing its interests on Syria with force. Israel’s intervention in the clashes was done partly to protect the Druze, Netanyahu says, but also to prevent the Syrian military from deploying in the south of the country.
Syrian activists are attacked with knives and sticks during a protest in front of the People’s Assembly building in Damascus denouncing the ongoing violence in Suwayda. Video footage showed the attackers shouting accusations of treason and using derogatory language towards a prominent activist who was imprisoned in Sednaya during Assad’s rule.
A sign from the protest that conveys the message “It is forbidden for Syrians to shed each other’s blood,” a saying that became popular in the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. [Zeina Shahla]
Al-Hajri puts out a call for an opening of a humanitarian corridor “in the direction of the Kurds.”
The DAANES puts out a statement in solidarity with the people of Suwayda and announces that they will be sending a humanitarian aid convoy, while also calling on more organizations to do the same.
18 July
The city of Suwayda remains calm after SCG forces leave, but clashes still continue in the western suburbs.
Video footage emerges of Druze individuals being humiliated and executed. Many videos capture elderly Druze men having their mustaches, a traditional marker of Druze identity, shaved or ripped off. Another widely-shared video shows three Druze of the same family being held at gunpoint and forced to jump off the balcony of an apartment building, while simultaneously being shot.
A Druze man having his mustache forcibly removed.
A member of the Arnous family being forced to jump off an apartment balcony while simultaneously being shot at.
19 July
According to the Syrian Ministry of Health, 260 people were killed during violence throughout the prior days, and 1,698 others were injured, including 425 critical cases. Meanwhile, SOHR’s death count is given at around 1,500.
President Ahmad al-Shara gives a speech in which he declares his appreciation for the role of the US throughout the conflict.
A Druze religious leader calls for humanitarian aid, claiming that aid is not allowed to pass through SCG checkpoints, while armed militants are able to pass freely.
22 July
Cautious calm across all fronts, while renewed clashes are still anticipated.
Large numbers of Bedouin tribal fighters are withdrawing from fronts where they were previously deployed.
The city of Suwayda remains safe due to local efforts to maintain stability.
Civil defense teams and citizens continue to remove bodies from the streets following the recent battles.
The Suwayda National Hospital is witnessing a serious crisis, as bodies begin to decompose due to remaining unburied for days.
Humanitarian aid is ready to be deployed to Suwayda from multiple fronts in Syria.
Bedouins leave Suwayda en masse to neighboring province Daraa, in order to escape the continued violent attacks by Druze factions. The SCG assists by providing buses for the transport.
According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 145,000 people have been displaced from the Suwayda governorate.
Outcome
Two weeks on, the situation remains tense but calm overall, with four people killed in the latest flare-up of violence. SCG General Security Forces have been deployed to Suwayda in coordination with local recruits from the region. Amid this relative calm, key questions are now emerging about access for aid, an inquiry into the violence, and the future of negotiations between the SCG and other communities and political actors in Syria.
First, while some humanitarian aid has been making its way into the province since 23 July, the DAANES is still awaiting approval from the SCG to deliver aid. “While the materials are at the ready, circumstances on the ground—coupled with the recent upheaval in the region—have rendered the situation untenable,” Sheikhmous Ahmed, head of the DAANES Office of Displaced Persons, tells RIC. “The presence of factions linked to the tribes and the authorities in Damascus has made it impossible to proceed with the delivery of these materials.” Ahmed states the DAANES face two primary challenges in delivering aid – the presence of armed factions and the siege on Suwayda. After a prior round of massacres in which SCG-affiliated fighters killed at least 1400 members of the Alawite community, the DAANES similarly attempted to send humanitarian aid to the affected regions, but again faced difficulties. Kurdish Red Crescent convoys were turned away due to not having permission from the SCG.
Protestors holding signs in Suwayda, pleading for the Damascus-Suwayda road to be open for humanitarian aid.
Protestor holding a sign that translates to: The official [state-run] media is deceptive and complicit in the suffocating siege on Suwayda. Save Suwayda.
Second, human rights organizations have collaborated with the local community in Suwayda to establish six committees in charge of documenting massacres, looting, robbery, and abductions throughout the conflict. The findings will then be submitted for international review, but questions remain as to whether this process can take place without undue influence from the SCG. Following the prior massacres targeting the Alawites, the SCG’s Justice Ministry announced the formation of a fact-finding and investigative committee to investigate the events, which has recently published its own findings. This report has been criticized by representatives of the Alawite community, suggesting that accountability measures must take place outside the SCG’s direct control.
Protestor holding a sign that says: We do not recognize the committee connected to the government of terrorism. [SOHR]
Protestor holding a sign that says: The committee appointed by the Jolani government is rejected, we call for an international investigation. The Syrian media is lying. [SOHR]
Finally, the events in Suwayda will also have ramifications for the DAANES and SDF. The SCG’s handling of the situation in Suwayda has further weakened al-Sharaa’s credibility as a leader capable of controlling his forces, deepening the mistrust in which he is held by minority groups in Syria, including the Kurds. The implementation of a March 10 agreement between the SDF and SCG was already at a standstill, with negotiations between the SCG and DAANES representatives making little to no progress. The events in Suwayda are therefore likely to be used by the SDF to underscore its case for remaining autonomous within a unified Syrian army. SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi has expressed willingness for the SDF to integrate with a new Syrian army so long as the SDF can remain as a unified bloc. This position has thus far been met with disagreement by the SCG, but Abdi may find his case strengthened given that Syria has already witnessed two major incidents of sectarian violence against minorities following the SCG’s takeover in Damascus. A full, independent investigation into the latest round of violence; access for aid delivered from other regions of Syria; and open, productive negotiations between the SCG and representatives of other Syrian communities can all help prevent a third outbreak of sectarian violence in Kurdish-led DAANES regions, or elsewhere in the country.