Explainer: Syria’s transitional constitution

On March 13th, the Syrian Caretaker Government (SCG) published the proposed constitution of the transitional period. The contents of the constitution, plus its drafting process, have been met with a sharp backlash. The criticisms made are centered around two issues. First, the marked centralization of power in the hands of the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, even as words and phrases suggestive of democratic practices are employed. Second, the exclusion of Syria’s various minority religions, ethnicities and languages from official recognition, with Islamic law enshrined as the country’s legal system foundation, just days after forces under the SCG’s ministry of defense carried out a massacre against Alawites in the coastal region of Latakia.

A five-year transitional period has now been outlined, which will end once there is a new constitution and elections, but it is unclear precisely how the permanent constitution will be negotiated and drafted. The transitional constitution was officially prepared by a small committee of seven people. The SCG was not transparent regarding the selection process for this committee. All seven were Sunni Arabs, leading to predictable criticisms regarding the committee not accounting for Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity. On the committee was only one constitutional law specialist. Limiting the independence of this committee was the fact that their draft had to be accepted by the HTS-led SCG. Indeed, not hours after the formation of the committee, al-Jazeera published a leaked draft of the constitution, which some took to mean that the committee would only have the power to suggest edits on a predetermined document. The National Dialogue Conference held in Damascus was also theoretically meant to inform the constitution writing process, however the 18-point output from the conference was vague, opaque, and non-binding in any case. Syria’s Kurdish National Council blamed the shortcomings in the transitional constitution on the composition of this drafting committee, arguing its members were not representative of Syria’s political, national, and religious diversity, hence “stripping it [the constitution drafting body] of inclusiveness and national consensus while reinforcing exclusion and monopolization of power.”

Ahmed al-Sharaa meets with the members of the drafting committee, 02.03.2025

While the final version of the transitional constitution differed slightly from the leaked draft, the key concern raised when the leak was published still remains: that the state system outlined lacks genuine democracy. It appears NES’ actors were not consulted on the constitution at all. DAANES foreign relations board co-chair Bedran Kurd admitted “we were later surprised” when the draft constitution was published just after the SDF-Damascus deal had been signed. He stated that this constitution was “issued without any meaningful participation or representation of Syria’s diverse communities,” including that of NES. He described this as “entirely unacceptable,” saying it was “in clear contradiction” to deal. 

The reference to “separation of powers” within the state structures is undermined by the vast centralization of authority in the hands of the interim president. The constitution outlines the scope of the president’s powers, some of which fall within the remit of what would be expected from a president’s duties, others of which exceed this. The president will serve as supreme leader of the military, and will manage Syrian affairs alongside his (personally appointed) ministers. He can declare a state of emergency and martial law, with the approval of the (personally appointed) National Security Council. Beyond this, Ahmed al-Sharaa will also have the right to propose laws and issue decrees with the force of law. Laws passed by the legislative can also be subject to the president’s veto – which requires a two-thirds majority from the legislature to be overridden. The president’s influence over the composition of the legislature means such an event is unlikely in any case. 

Nominally, the president’s powers will be subject to oversight from the people’s council (parliament). The president cannot dissolve the people’s council, which will have authority over legislation, plus the power to summon and question ministers. Yet, one third of the people’s council members are to be appointed by the president until a permanent constitution is adopted and elections can be held. The rest of the council’s composition will be determined by a ‘high committee.’ The president will appoint this committee. At the same time, the old Constitutional court is dissolved, and a new judicial framework will be established. Although the judiciary is termed “independent” in the constitution, the interim president has power to appoint all judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court, which serves as Syria’s highest judicial authority. All in all, none of the state’s representatives will be directly elected by the population. Drafting committee member Abd al-Hamid al-Awak, said that while executive power is restricted to the president, legislation lies in the hands of the people’s council, who could also sack the president if deemed necessary. In the same comment, he added that while “theoretically” such a sacking is possible, “practically it is going to be extremely difficult because the members [of the people’s council] are going to be appointed directly by the president himself.”

The National Security Council must approve presidential calls for a state of emergency. Yet the current – newly formed – eight-person National Security Council is already hand-picked by al-Sharaa, who heads the council. It contains the foreign minister, defense minister, interior minister, and national intelligence chief, plus two “advisory” members and a technical expert appointed by the president. Three of those current ministers, as selected by al-Sharaa, were alongside him in Jabhat al-Nusra/HTS: foreign minister, Asad al-Shaibani, intelligence chief, Anas Khattab, and defense minister, Murhaf Abu Qasrah. Interior Minister Ali Keddah is also HTS-linked: he was the former prime minister of the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib. 

Additionally, while the right political participation and the formation of Syrian parties is respected, such formation activities are forbidden until a “party law” regulating them is produced. This means there will be no formal pluralism or official political opposition. The Syrian Democratic Council argued the draft constitution “reproduces authoritarianism in a new form” by entrenching “central rule and grants the executive authority absolute powers.” The SDC statement described the restrictions on political parties as “directly obstruct[ing] the path of democratic transition.”

The draft transitional period constitution also referenced state commitment to accountability for crimes committed and the development of transitional justice mechanisms. Yet calls for accountability from the SCG have so far been practically directed just as those individuals and groups linked with Assad. Past and ongoing violations from all parties, including HTS and the SNA, need to be addressed in order to ensure justice. Those groups which now form the backbone of Syria’s new army have a track record of human rights abuses and violations of international law. Citing a commitment to justice rings hollow given the slew of violence recently unleashed against the Alawite population at the Syrian coast by HTS and SNA forces. At least 1,000 Alawites were killed when Assad loyalists ambushed SCG General Security personnel, prompting a mass mobilization of SCG forces to carry out a combing operation that saw Alawite civilians murdered, abused, and forced from their homes which were then looted and burned, as condemned by the United Nations and various rights watchdogs. No serious accountability or justice measures have been pursued by the SCG up until now. Additionally, the SCG has so far not advanced any legal framework which outlines a procedure of such transitional justice that distinguishes between civilians, forcibly conscripted soldiers, and those truly complicit in the crimes committed by Assad’s security and military institutions.

The drafting committee described the constitution as seeking to “balance between social security and freedom” in the transitional period, however such references to freedom are undermined by what is contained in the document. The transitional constitution pays lip service to general rights, such as the safeguarding of human rights and freedoms as per humanitarian norms, judicial independence, and the protection of freedom of speech, press and expression. Yet these guarantees are tempered by their conditionality on “public order” and “national unity”. Alongside a commitment to national unity, respect for cultural diversity is referenced; stipulations that are unlikely to achieve any concrete such protections on their own. Women and children’s rights are briefly noted, but this has done little to allay concerns about the fate of women within a Syria in which the government’s key members are mostly from HTS and its predecessor Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch). Indeed, the constitution as a whole makes scant reference to women, and no mention of equality between men and women. The Syrian Women’s Council criticized the exclusion of “the contributions of Syrian women in the long struggle against dictatorship,” terming this a “systematic injustice that is incompatible with the aspirations of women to actively participate in the nation-building process.”

In NES, various different protests occurred in the days following the constitution’s publication. On March 15th in Qamishlo, a women’s march gathered thousands together to demand reconsideration of the constitution, informed by discussions with women’s activists over how to formally recognise women’s participation, struggles, and rights. Bediya Arabo, a demonstrator at the march from Darbasiyah, told RIC: “Thousands of women sacrificed themselves to gain rights for women. The fight women have waged in North and East Syria was also to protect the land and people here. But still today, we see that a mentality that excludes and oppresses women is continually perpetuated. It is like the old regime repeated. We want to discuss with the new authority in Damascus. They can make research on women’s issues and struggles. We want to do this together, to see women’s rights properly included in the constitution. This is our call.”

Women’s march in Qamishlo, 15.03.2025

While the constitution stipulates that freedom of belief is inviolable, and instructs the state to respect all religions and their associated practices, it also states that the Syrian president must be a Muslim, and that Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is “the main source of legislation.” This is a slight change to the old constitution, in which it was pointed to as “a main source of legislation”. With Islamic law as “the” primary source of legislation, it is unclear how rights stipulated in the draft that contradict with Islamic law will be realised in practice. Many highlighted the risk of a sectarian theocracy being established. 

As per the draft transitional constitution, the Syrian Arab Republic will not be seeing a name change any time soon, and neither will languages other than Arabic be recorded as formal state languages. When an updated version of the North and East Syria region’s ‘Social Contract’ – which acted as a constitution, codifying the principles by which the region would be governed – was published in 2023, it described the NES region as forming a part of the “Syrian Democratic Republic”. This suggested name change reflected an effort to contribute to ending the exclusion of Syrian Kurdish and other non-Arab communities from formal recognition within the Syrian state. Additionally, the Social Contract enshrined Arabic, Kurdish, and Syriac as three official languages in the DAANES areas. Commenting on the transitional constitution, the DAANES stated that it flew in the face of Syria’s diversity and was a “falsification of Syria’s national and societal identity […] devoid of the imprint and spirit of the people of Syria and its various components,” highlighting the exclusion of Kurds, Syriac Assyrians and other minorities from the document. 

Kurdish political activist and writer, Polat Can, who also served in NES’ military forces and was one of the founding members of the YPG, described the transitional constitution as “a blueprint for authoritarianism, sectarianism, and ethnic exclusion.” Can argued that the door to authoritarianism is opened because while the transition period is set at five years, it can be extended indefinitely according to “security and political conditions”. With the president appointing the people’s council members, and the people’s council responsible for legislation, democratic norms of checks and balances are severely weakened. “The president is both ruler and lawmaker – a clear abuse of power,” said Can. He also condemned the references to “public order” and “national unity” as conditions upon which personal freedoms will be regulated, saying “this language has always been used to justify repression.”