Explainer: the SDF-Damascus agreement

On March 10th, the Syrian Caretaker Government (SCG) president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander-in-Chief, Mazloum Abdi, reached an agreement outlining NES-Damascus administrative, military and security integration, to be implemented by the end of the year. According to the announcement from the Syrian Presidency, the agreement was “stipulating the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the institutions of the Syrian Arab Republic, emphasizing the unity of Syrian territory and rejecting partition.”

The deal contains eight points:

1. Guarantees the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process and all state institutions based on competence, regardless of their religious and ethnic backgrounds.
2. The Kurdish community is native to Syria; the Syrian state guarantees its right to citizenship and all its constitutional rights.
3. Ceasefire on all Syrian territories.
4. Integrating all NES civil and military institutions into the Syrian state administration, including border crossings, the airport, and oil and gas fields.
5. Ensuring the return of all displaced Syrians to their towns and villages and ensuring their protection by the Syrian state.
6. Supporting the Syrian state in its fight against remnants of Assad and all threats to its security.
7. Rejecting calls for division, hate speech, and attempts to spread discord within all parts of Syrian society.
8. Executive Committees are working and striving to implement the agreement no later than the end of this year.

The significance of the meeting was widely acknowledged, with it being the first time Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi convened publicly. The second point of the deal – formal recognition of Syria’s Kurds – was also considered historic, in light of the decades-long discrimination the Kurdish population inside Syria has experienced from the central state. Most notably, in 1962, Kurds were stripped of their citizenship en masse. The government conducted a census in Heseke governorate, in which Kurds had to prove that they had been living in Syria since at least 1945. With the census lasting just one day, many had no time to prove this, and the authorities released little information about the census ahead of time. Tens of thousands lost their Syrian citizenship – which then meant their children also could not acquire it. By 2011, the number of formally stateless Kurds in Syria had reached half a million. 

However, practically, there was little new or unexpected contained within the agreement. The key points were things both sides had previously vocalized that they accepted since NES-Damascus talks began at the end of December. The agreement had no details regarding how military, administrative, economic or resource integration would concretely be achieved or what kind of implementation process was ahead. 

In this light, the deal signed is “just a memorandum of understanding,” as an SDF source told RIC. “Now at least there are two sides agreeing on taking time to discuss everything in detail before rushing to implement any change. That’s positive. But there isn’t anything in the agreement we did not agree to in principle before.” Indeed, the DAANES, SDF and SDC had already announced in February that they were focused on finding “an appropriate implementation mechanism” for integration of military and administration institutions. Points of friction, such as the SDF’s wish to retain its form as a distinct force meeting with al-Sharaa’s demand that the SDF fully dissolve itself and individual fighters re-enter the new Syrian army, are still not resolved.

Yet, as the final point of the deal lays out, committees will now be formed to work on the practicalities of realizing what has been agreed upon. The deal “will not translate to any real change on the ground unless the joint committees agree on everything,” explained an SDF source. DAANES Executive Council co-chair, Hussein Othman, told RIC that key committees, such economic, political, administrative and security ones, will aim to “establish a set of understandings with Damascus.” 

Executive Council member Hassan Kocher explained that the establishment of these committees will see the DAANES get more involved in the process, and confirmed that up until now, NES-Damascus dialogue had been only between military forces. “The SDF is the one conducting these meetings with HTS. They officially met twice. The DAANES has still not yet joined the discussions as a civil administration, because the meetings were held with military forces. Now, after these meetings, and after the basic points having been discussed, DAANES committees will be made: economic, political, and social committees. All components within NES will participate: Arabs, Syriacs, others. There will also be a committee for the Kurdish issue.” Kocher added that these committees will also seek to play a role in determining Syria’s permanent future constitution. “These committees will have discussions concerning what the Syrian constitution will look like, how we will be included in it, and what the Syrian state will look like. All of this and more details will be discussed after the committees are formed.” The DAANES’ will here seems genuine. However, with the recent publication of the transitional constitution, in which power was heavily centralized in the hands of the interim president al-Sharaa and democratic checks-and-balances curtailed, it seems highly possible that the drafting process for the future constitution will remain squarely in al-Sharaa’s hands.

Kocher said that widening participation within the processes of building the new Syrian state was important, while at the same time each region should be able to consider its unique conditions and needs. “The basic items approved so far require further serious discussion, because all of Syria’s peoples must participate in this new administration. This is one side. Another side is also about protecting regional autonomy a bit. The central state can’t interfere in all regional matters. The state has its fundamental tasks for its central institutions. But this can work alongside regional peoples’ institutions – and we can discuss on this basis.”

Addressing speculation over the fate of NES’ Arab-majority regions, with some saying many Arab people there would prefer administrative affiliation with Damascus, Kocher said: “It is not a matter of ‘giving up’ a region or ‘keeping it’. The Arab community – and all other communities – of the country have their own will. All communities have to be considered. They should have their say in the fate of their region. They should be able to govern it themselves. It has now been several years that there has been stability there [in NES’ Arab-majority regions]. They – the people there – achieved that. They have their will. No one is ‘surrendering’ their region to anyone. […] Those regions have their own experiences. Many of the sons and daughters of that region chose to join the SDF to liberate their regions from ISIS. They sacrificed thousands of lives to do this.”

In this light, there have been no changes on the ground since the signing of the agreement. Othman, confirmed to RIC that NES’ counter-ISIS operations will continue as before, but new security and intelligence cooperation with Damascus is now possible: “SDF and International Coalition agreements remain in force. There will be no change in this regard. The SDF is authorized to fight ISIS in NES. There may be security and intelligence cooperation with Damascus in this regard [… but] Damascus’ participation requires discussion, understanding and a full evaluation process.” The idea of the SCG genuinely joining the fight against ISIS has raised some eyebrows. While US-led counter-ISIS operations, with SDF and/or Damascus’ participation, may lead to degradation of the organizational structure of ISIS in Syria, truly combating the violent and intolerant ideology promoted by jihadist groups seems even less feasible with the SCG – led by a core group of former al-Nusra/HTS members – in power. The murder of over 1,000 Alawites at the hands of SCG forces in Latakia just last week starkly resembled the numerous massacres that occurred throughout the Syrian Civil War by jihadist factions including ISIS and HTS predecessor Jabhat al-Nusra. Additionally, the presence of former ISIS fighters within HTS has been recorded, including by the UN Security Council. While they are no longer taking orders from ISIS leadership, they still proudly show ISIS badges and symbols, clearly indicating an ideological stance. Following HTS’ ascendance to power in Damascus, ISIS badges and jihadist symbols were openly displayed in the streets of Damascus and other Syrian cities.

Othman added that the deployment of the new Syrian army to border areas in NES will be discussed: “State national armies are responsible for protecting the state and its borders and repelling any attack on the sovereignty of the state. Integration of the SDF into the army means this national institution should protect the country. The details of distribution and deployment will be the result of internal discussions.” Farhad Shami, head of the SDF media center, also clarified to media that the new Syrian army, under the Syrian Caretaker Government (SCG), will not enter the NES region aside from potentially at border gates, and that there is no present change in the situation of the ISIS prisons or the fight against ISIS in NES. 

Kocher stated that the US did play a role in bringing about the deal, because “they have been present in NES for Syria for years and are fighting ISIS through an alliance with the SDF. They assisted in setting up the meetings with Damascus. On this basis they played a role in these negotiations, encouraging a political solution not a military one.”

Othman stressed that the process ahead should remain free from foreign interference: “One of the biggest challenges is regional interventions that aim to obstruct reaching sustainable understandings. The Syrian will must put national interests above all other considerations. There should be a unified position against these interventions in purely Syrian affairs.” He also argued that the deal reflected the commitment of the SDF to a unified Syria: “The DAANES and SDF have shown to all that they are a national project, especially after the defeat of ISIS, pursuit of sleeper cells, and the success of the DAANES in bringing stability to the areas it governs. With the recent signing of the agreement, the SDF has proven it has a Syrian national project, which it has always emphasized.” 

Despite the deal stipulating commitment to a Syria-wide ceasefire, RIC recorded that Turkish and SNA attacks on NES continued after the Damascus-NES agreement, including shelling on Tel Tamir city center and outskirts, shelling around Sarrin, drone strikes on civilian protest site at the Tishreen Dam, plus airstrikes and shelling at the Manbij frontline. A RIC researcher visited the Tishreen Dam civilian protest to monitor the situation and reported on March 12th: “There were 10 drone strikes on the dam body this morning. In recent days, they have struck the dam a lot, but no one was outside. Cars were damaged [pictured]. The sound of air strikes from the frontline several kilometers away is also audible.” This is notable, because the SNA announced their dissolution and integration under the Ministry of Defence two months ago. Hence the groups currently attacking NES are part of the new Syrian army.

Regarding the possibility that the successful implementation of a NES-Damascus deal could make way for a withdrawal of US forces from Syria, Kocher declined to comment, saying: “I don’t speculate on what America wants or doesn’t want. […] This issue is related to America’s interests and their plans in the region; not only in Syria but in the Middle East. This is a reality. All big powers in the Middle East go according to their interests, rather than for us. Therefore, their withdrawal is not related to us, but rather to their interests. ISIS still exists and is trying to revitalize itself, and they recognize this.”

The promise of ensuring the safe return of all Syrian IDPs under state protection is particularly pertinent for the NES region. Turkey and its proxy Syrian force, the SNA, invaded NES in 2018 and 2019, emptying the formerly Kurdish-majority areas of Afrin and Sere Kaniye of most of their original inhabitants. Unable to return due to the violence and criminal activity perpetuated by the SNA factions who came to control the Turkish-occupied areas, several IDP camps were constructed in NES to house those who were willing to wait years in hope of a return to their home regions. Others felt they had no choice but to leave for Europe, with their homes already seized and confiscated by SNA members, their lands and property plundered. Religious minorities such as Yazidis and Christians saw their shrines and graves destroyed and desecrated by the SNA. A further SNA attack in December 2024 expelled the population of Shehba – adjacent to Afrin – creating another flow of IDPs into NES. Many of those who fled upon the SNA’s onslaught were IDPs from Afrin, hence were experiencing forced displacement at the hands of the SNA for a second time. While the return of three quarters of a million Syrian IDPs has been recorded since Assad fell, the continued Turkish occupation and SNA control of Afrin and Sere Kaniye remain an obstacle preventing those area’s original inhabitants from going back to their homes. In this light, any practical steps taken to achieve point five of the agreement will have to account for both Turkey and the SNA.

The sixth point of the agreement, referencing fighting Assad-affiliated cells, was met with concern by many, in light of the massacre of Alawites that had occurred at the hands of SCG forces at Syria’s coast just days earlier. On March 6th, pro-Assad militiamen carried out a series of attacks against local SCG General Security. With the element of surprise on their side, they seized control of a few neighbourhoods and stretches of mountainous countryside in Latakia. In response, the SCG announced a mass mobilization of its forces, initiating a combing operation across the whole region. The insurgent cells were soon defeated, and all towns and cities were again in the hands of the SCG by the 7th. Yet, forces under the new Syrian army proceeded to unleash a slew of violence against the Alawites, killing an estimated 1,000 people, filming themselves carrying out humiliating abuse and field executions. Corpses were dumped in the streets by the SCG forces, who also burned and looted Alawite homes, marking the worst violence seen in Syria since the fall of Assad. Likely addressing those who questioned the SDF’s decision to sign a deal with Damascus in these circumstances, the DAANES foreign relations department co-chair, Ilham Ahmed, stated that the SDF-Damascus deal “is a step aimed at stopping […] the painful events witnessed by our people on the coast,” as well as all military operations on Syrian soil. She added: “We hope that this agreement will pave the way for comprehensive national reconciliation, a path of true transitional justice.”

Domestically, news of the agreement brought widespread celebrations across the country, as many viewed it as an important step towards internal unity, preventing further bloodshed and establishing the groundwork enabling Syria to rebuild itself again. Internationally, positive statements from all key regional players ensued.